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REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION-THE DEMISE OF
TERRY v. OHIO AND INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
Presume not that I am the thing I was."
I. INTRODUCTION
The plethora of law review articles2 and cases' on search and seizure
demonstrates the confusion and frustration in fourth amendment stop-
and-frisk jurisprudence. The fourth amendment to the Constitution guar-
antees that persons will be free of "unreasonable searches and seizures
... and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause."4 A "stop-and-
frisk" is a warrantless detention and search of a person by a police officer
to investigate for unlawfulness.5 Although the United States Supreme
Court has issued many investigative stop decisions, the Court has failed
to promulgate a coherent and practical stop-and-frisk procedure for law
enforcement personnel to follow. In short, "it]he Fourth Amendment
cases are a mess."
6
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, II HENRY IV, V.V.
2. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.1
(1987); see, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349
(1974); Anderson, Everything You Wanted to Know About Terry Stops-But Thought It
Was a Violation of the Fourth Amendment to Stop Someone and Ask, ARMY LAW., Feb.
1988, at 25; Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause,
1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763 (1979); Harper, Has the Replacement of "Probable Cause" with "Rea-
sonable Suspicion" Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 AKRON
L. REV. 13 (1988); Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention, and Frisk, 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 597 (1967); Wiseman, The "Reasonableness" of the Investigative Detention:
An "Ad Hoc" Constitutional Test, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 641 (1984). Professors Amsterdam,
Bacigal, Harper, Wiseman, and Kuh acknowledge the potential danger of the amorphous
balancing test, but each scholar advocates a different solution to the problem; see infra, text
accompanying notes 151-154.
3. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210
(1984); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983);
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). This is not an exhaustive list of the Supreme Court
cases examining stop-and-frisk; discussing all of them is more redundant than enlightening.
4. U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
6. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawy-
ering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973). Professor Dworkin supports the adoption of precise rules
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The Supreme Court first began tampering with the rigid "probable
cause" requirement that protects individual privacy rights in Camara v.
Municipal Court,7 which involved an administrative search. The Court in
Camara applied a balancing test, weighing the governmental interest in
administrative searches against individual privacy concerns for the sanc-
tity of one's home. In Terry v. Ohio,8 the cornerstone of the stop-and-
frisk doctrine, the Court dispensed with the necessity of probable cause
by applying the Camara balancing test to the police detention and pat-
down of a suspicious individual.
Justice William Brennan's frequent concurrencesO and dissents10 in
stop-and-frisk cases have recorded the Court's gradual erosion of Terry's
investigative stop rule. Justice Brennan strongly advocated a narrow con-
struction of the Terry holding and admonished that:
It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards
of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy.
History bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty ex-
tinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end. 1
This note discusses how Supreme Court decisions after Camara and
Terry, while purporting to follow these watershed cases, instead have cor-
rupted the narrow stop-and-frisk doctrine. Section II reviews the history
and language of the fourth amendment. Section III shows that the Su-
preme Court cases following Terry have expanded and consequently evis-
cerated Terry's important guidelines. Essentially, these decisions strip
the fourth amendment of all privacy guarantees. Section IV of this note
demonstrates the difficulty of constitutional interpretation in the area of
investigative stops, and lists proposals by academics.
concerning search and seizure which would allow the exclusionary rule to work more effec-
tively with less criticism.
7. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see also Bacigal, supra note 2, at 777.
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 818 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring); United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 236 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 362
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 509 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
10. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 655 (1990)
(Marshall, J., dissenting with whom Brennan, J., joins); United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. 531, 545 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 702 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 225 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1054
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567
(1976)(Brennan, J., dissenting); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
11. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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The Supreme Court's break with the framers' intent, scholarly inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment's semantic construction, and the utili-
zation of the fourth amendment to favor current law enforcement prac-
tices results in a precarious and unpredictable balancing approach. This
note suggests a return to the principled and functional approach to stop-
and-frisk enunciated in Terry v. Ohio.12
II. A HISTORY AND GRAMMAR LESSON
The extensive powers of search and seizure authorized by King George
II formed a principal cause for discontent among the American colo-
nists.'3 The King's Writs of Assistance empowered customs officers to
"break open and enter houses, without the authority of a civil magistrate,
founded on legal information."' 4 This type of power cut against the grain
of historical limits on searches and seizures. 15 William Pitt's proclamation
in the House of Commons in 1763 evidences that the English valued the
sanctity of the home:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;
the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not
enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."
However, officially-sanctioned violations of colonists' rights of privacy in
their homes and places of work continued. Perhaps the most vivid exam-
ple of these transgressions involved the search of the home of legal
scholar, Sir Edward Coke: "As Coke lay dying in the great curtained bed,
they ransacked study and library, took away the manuscripts for all four
parts of the Institutes, [and] the manuscript notes for additional books of
Reports.""' Not surprisingly, the colonists made the search and seizure
grievance a focal point in their conflict with England."
These abuses of privacy rights led to the adoption, in 1791, of the
fourth amendment to the Constitution. 9 Proper construction of the
12. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13. Grayson, The Warrant Clause in Historical Context, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 107, 108
(1987). For a more comprehensive work, see N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1970).
14. N. LASSON, supra note 13, at 75.
15. See id. at 13-19 (tracing search and seizure through the Bible, Roman history and law,
as well as through the Anglo-Saxon and Norman eras).
16. Grayson, supra note 13 at 112 (quoting 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 611 n.1 (1927)).
17. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT. A STUDY IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 23 (1966) (quoting C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 1552-1634, 533 (1957)).
18. Id. at 37-38.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment proclaims
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amendment has been the subject of academic inquiry, with the focus on
the interpretation of the conjunction "and" that separates the unreasona-
ble search clause from the warrant clause. One scholar, Professor Landyn-
ski, 20 noted three possible interpretations:
(1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant require-
ments specified in the second clause;
(2) that the first clause provides an additional restriction by implying
that some searches may be "unreasonable" and therefore not permissible,
even when made under a warrant; or
(3) that the first clause provides an additional search power, authorizing
the judiciary to find some searches "reasonable" even when carried out
without warrant."'
After examining the history of search and seizure, Professor Landynski
concluded that only the first two theories could be consistent with the
intent of the constitutional framers.22 Through its decisions, however, the
Court has embraced the third theory, the only theory contrary to the
framer's notions of permissible behavior.
These differing interpretations of the fourth amendment cloud its
meaning. Debatably, this semantic conflict precludes lucid interpretation
of the fourth amendment. The Court will remain unable to articulate a
clear stop-and-frisk standard because courts and legal scholars will con-
tinue to disagree on the fourth amendment's limitations. In short, the
judiciary and the academics disagree on the proper reference point for
interpretation. Without a common point of origin, courts will remain una-
ble to fashion an acceptable and feasible stop-and-frisk doctrine. Juxta-
posing the concerns for privacy with the ambiguity that surrounds the
fourth amendment produces the muddled backdrop and starting point for
modern decisions and analysis.
III. A PREDICTABLE EVOLUTION
A. The First Step: The Exclusionary Rule and the Balancing Test
When the Court decided Mapp v. Ohio2 3 it mandated the exclusionary
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
20. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at 42-43; see also Grayson, supra note 13, at 115-20.
21. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at 42-43 (emphasis in original).
22. Id. at 43.
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp approved the exclusionary rule, which precludes the use of
illegally obtained evidence or any other evidence that flows from the illegal search and
seizure. Id. Before Mapp the option to implement the exclusionary rule was left to the
[Vol. 25:543
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rule, precluding the use of illegally obtained evidence or any other evi-
dence that flows from the illegal search or seizure, the proverbial "fruit of
the poisonous tree." '24 Mapp ended an era of judicial silence on the con-
stitutionality of investigative stops.2 5 The Court was soon pressured to set
guidelines for investigative detentions for magistrates, law enforcement
officers, and administrators to follow.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,28 Mr. Camara refused to allow a munic-
ipal housing inspector access to his home for a routine inspection because
the inspector did not have a search warrant. Police officers arrested
Camara for his refusal pursuant to the Housing Code.2 7 The Court fash-
ioned a balancing test to evaluate Camara's objection to the warrantless
routine inspection of his home in light of the government's desire to effec-
tuate housing inspections. When evaluating these competing interests,
courts must weigh the government's need to search against the level of
intrusion traditionally protected by the fourth amendment.2 After imple-
menting the balancing approach in Camara, the Court quickly expanded
this new test, with massive repercussions.
B. Terry, The First Leap
In Terry v. Ohio,29 police officer Martin McFadden observed three men
acting suspiciously as if they were "casing" a store. Officer McFadden ap-
proached the men and asked them perfunctory investigative questions
which they answered with mumbles. Fearing for his own safety and the
safety of others nearby, Officer McFadden conducted a pat-down search
of the suspects' outer garments for weapons and found a revolver. Subse-
quently Terry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.30 At a sup-
states. By constitutionalizing the exclusionary rule, Mapp made its use mandatory by all the
states.
24. 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 3.1, 9.3-.5 (1984)[hereinafter
LAFAVE & ISRAEL].
25. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 9.1(a) at 335.
26. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
27. Id. at 525-27.
28. Id. at 536-37. The Court stated:
In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that
such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the
traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual,
and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding
these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the
Fourth Amendment protections.
Id. (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959)).
According to Professor Bacigal, the Camara decision was the first step in the fall of the
towering probable cause requirement. Bacigal, supra note 2, at 777.
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
30. Id. at 4-7.
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pression hearing, Terry argued that this pat-down violated the fourth
amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches, because the of-
ficer lacked probable cause to search and arrest Terry." The Court ap-
plied the Camara balancing test, weighing the state's interest in protect-
ing the safety of its police officers and citizens against the intrusion on
the citizen's rights of privacy.32 The Court concluded that the state's in-
terest was stronger. 33
The Terry decision allows investigatory detentions of individuals so
that police can search for weapons to protect themselves and the public.
The Court concluded that these detentions can only take place when the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual is
armed; a mere "hunch" is inadequate to support a stop.3 In reaching its
decision, the Court indicated that the scope of the search must not exceed
the actions necessary to determine whether the suspicious individual is
armed. 5
Justice Douglas astutely warned of the implications of the monumental
leap taken in Terry. He cautioned, "[t]here have been powerful hydraulic
pressures throughout history that bear heavily on the Court to water
down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That
hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today. 
'
36
The Court foresaw the potentially broad construction that could be
placed on the newly legitimized stop-and-frisk power. Consequently, in
one of Terry's companion cases, Sibron v. New York, 37 the Court invali-
dated a search conducted by an officer who did not fear for his safety. In
31. Id. at 7-8.
32. Id. at 21. The Court stated that balancing was the only ready test for determining
reasonableness. Id. (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)).
33. Id. at 24. "[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to
protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may
lack probable cause for an arrest." Id.
34. Id. at 27. The Court summarized:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weap-
ons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evi-
dence against the person from whom they were taken.
Id. at 30-31.
35. Id. at 29.
36. Id. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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Sibron, the Court emphasized the need for a dangerous threat before en-
gaging in a Terry stop. In Peters v. New York, 38 also decided the same
day as Terry, the Court held that the police had probable cause for an
investigative detention, thereby foregoing utilization of the balancing
analysis. The existence of probable cause mandates extensive searches
without engaging in the balancing analysis, separating probable cause
cases from stop-and-frisk/balancing cases. Depending upon one's perspec-
tive, Terry and its companion cases either opened Pandora's box or
opened the doorway to more effective law enforcement.
C. Descending into the Abyss: The Cases that Disturbed the Terry
Standard
In the following investigative stop cases39 the Court tried to fashion
boundaries for its new doctrine, but the clarification process resulted in
the loss of the "particularized suspicion" requirement. The decision in
Adams v. Williams40 constitutes the first monster that emerged from
Pandora's box or, alternatively, the first tin-star-wearing lawman to step
through the doorway of vigilante crime fighting. Adams validated the
constitutionality of a detention and search which revealed a weapon. The
search was solely predicated on an informant's tip. When the informant's
tip would not pass muster under the two-pronged test of Aguilar v.
Texas"1 to determine "substantial reliability,"4 2 the Court circumvented
its ruling by allowing the detention and search under the Terry decision,
declaring "[o]ne simple rule will not cover every situation,"43 and that the
informant's tip carried enough "indicia of reliability"" to justify the
detention.
As the majority proceeded to push fourth amendment jurisprudence
onto the summit of a "slippery slope," Justice Brennan attempted most
vehemently to dig in his heels and stop the fall. Justice Brennan noted
the damages of a broad application of the stop-and-frisk rule in Adams.
38. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
39. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1974); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972).
40. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
41. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The two-pronged test of Aguilar required (1) underlying circum-
stances from which the informant could know what he or she professes to know; and (2)
underlying circumstances from which the officer could conclude that the informant was
credible. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 24, at § 3.3(c) at 192-203; see Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (following Aguilar). The
Gates decision changed the Aguilar and Spinelli warrant test to one of reasonableness
under the circumstances, further diluting concrete criteria in search and seizure cases.
42. Bacigal, supra note 2, at 775.
43. Id. at 783 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147).
44. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147.
1991] 549
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His dissent, quoting Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, bears repeating: "There is too much danger that, instead of the
stop being the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the re-
verse will be true. '45 Acknowledging the widening of latitude in law en-
forcement discretion, Justice Brennan revealed his fear of the disintegra-
tion of previously safeguarded rights. The Justice explained that Terry
"was meant for the serious cases of imminent danger or of harm recently
perpetrated to persons or property. . . I greatly fear that if the [con-
trary view] should be followed, Terry will have opened the sluicegates for
serious and unintended erosion of the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 46 Therefore, Adams v. Williams4 is tremendously significant be-
cause the Court advocated further expansion of the Terry holding.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,4 the Court declared that the bor-
der patrol's practice of stopping cars and questioning occupants as to
their citizenship violated the fourth amendment. In finding the national
origin of the vehicle's occupants, alone, did not rise to the level of reason-
able articulable suspicion, the Court balanced the governmental interest
in immigration regulation against the intrusion on the individual's pri-
vacy interest.49 Although the Court found the intrusion to be "modest,"5
the degree of interference was still too high. This ruling was no victory for
proponents of strict Terry interpretation, however, because the Court ap-
plied the balancing test to a situation in which the physical safety of
neither the police nor the public was at stake.51 Brignoni-Ponce expanded
the Terry doctrine to allow law enforcement officers to make investigative
stops regarding possible past, non-violent crimes.2 By stepping away
from present or impending crimes to past crimes, the Court expanded
Terry to include a large class of previously unsanctioned searches. The
move from fear of imminent danger to suspicion of any criminal activity
is no less massive. The race to embrace the balancing test buried the ra-
tionale of the Terry decision.
In cases involving suspected violations of immigration laws the Court
dilutes and even eradicates protective standards. In United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,53 the Court stated curtly that border encounters are
45. Id. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d
Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
46. Id. at 153 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d at 39
(Friendly, J., dissenting)).
47. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
48. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
49. Id. at 876.
50. Id. at 879-80.
51. Harper, supra note 2, at 28.
52. Id.
53. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
550 [Vol. 25:543
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"subject to less stringent constitutional safeguards." 4 The border patrol
stopped the appellants away from the Mexican border at a permanent
checkpoint even though the patrol had no reason to suspect that the ap-
pellants were aliens or were transporting aliens.5  The Court stated that
use of the "reasonable suspicion" doctrine would have been "impracti-
cal."56 Justice Brennan, in a blistering dissent,57 wrote, "the Court's argu-
ment fails for [a] basic reason[]. There is no principle in the jurispru-
dence of fundamental rights which permits constitutional limitations to
be dispensed with merely because they cannot be conveniently satis-
fied."5' 8 Martinez-Fuerte eliminated the requirement of individualized
suspicion, at least in border search cases, and flung open the door to the
demise of individualized suspicion in all cases.59
The next major blow to the stop-and-frisk doctrine came in Pennsylva-
nia v. Mimms. 0 In Mimms, a police officer stopped Mimms' car after no-
ticing an expired registration sticker on his vehicle. The officer ordered
54. Id. at 555.
55. Id. at 547.
56. Id. at 557. The Court found:
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reasonable sus-
picion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow
the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possi-
ble carrier of illegal aliens.
Id. (emphasis added).
57. Justice Brennan begins the dissent: "Today's decision is the ninth this Term marking
the continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures." Id. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He then listed the other eight
cases: Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (permitting the warrantless search of an automo-
bile in police custody despite unreasonableness of the custody and opportunity to obtain a
warrant); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (public arrests never need warrants
even if there exists an opportunity to get one); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976)(approved warrantless arrest of individual standing in doorway of home); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (denying the existence of a protectible privacy interest
in personal banking materials); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)(disallowing federal col-
lateral relief for fourth amendment claims); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (evi-
dence unconstitutionally seized by state officer admissible by United States in civil proceed-
ing); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)(allowidfg indiscriminate inventory
searches of impounded automobiles); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)(weakening
fourth amendment proscription against general warrants).
58. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 575 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan con-
cluded by asserting:
The cornerstone of this society, indeed of any free society, is orderly procedure. ...
[T]o permit, as the Court does today, police discretion to supplant the objectivity of
reason and, thereby, expediency to reign in the place of order, is to undermine Fourth
Amendment safeguards and threaten erosion of the cornerstone of our system of a
government, for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us, "[tihe history of American
freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure."
Id. at 578 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945)).
59. See infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
60. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
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the driver out of the car according to his usual procedure. He then no-
ticed a bulge in the driver's jacket pocket, frisked the motorist and found
a gun.el The Court approved this practice because the officer acted out of
concern for his safety when he searched for the weapon. The Court deter-
mined the governmental interest in police safety to be "legitimate and
weighty"62 and the intrusion on Mimms "de minimis." 3 Justice Stevens
noted in his dissent, "this kind of seizure . . . leaves police discretion ut-
terly without limits." 4 Where the traffic-stop-safety rationale would ap-
ply to any passengers in the car as well, Mimms, like Martinez-Fuerte5
alleviated the need for particularized suspicion.6
Professor Rosenberg bluntly criticized the Mimms decision:
Acting cavalierly and without acknowledging that it was even doing so, the
Mimms Court effected a major doctrinal shift in fourth amendment juris-
prudence by creating a new class of "tertiary" seizures governed by neither
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion-indeed, a seizure governed by no
articulable standard other than the police officer's fancy.
17
The new class of searches referred to by Professor Rosenberg and Justice
Stevens are a product of "generalized suspicion." This standard allows
law enforcement officers the latitude to search if they reasonably suspect
that something is awry. 6
In the decisions in Adams v. Williams,69 Brignoni-Ponce,7 0 Martinez-
Fuerte,'7 1 and Mimms,7 2 the narrow stop-and-frisk test in Terry steadily
degenerated into a blanket power for law enforcement personnel to effect
a seizure for past, non-violent crimes. As a result of broadening Terry,
officers may frisk any person involved in the most trivial legal infraction,
61. Id. at 107.
62. Id. at 110.
63. Id. at 111.
64. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. 428 U.S. 543 (1976); see supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
66. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 122-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Rosenberg, Notes From the Underground. A Substantive Analysis of Summary Ad-
judication by the Burger Court: Part II, 19 Hous. L. REv. 831, 890-91 (1982) (footnotes
omitted). Professor Rosenberg views summary adjudication as an evil that haunts the
growth of constitutional doctrines including the fourth amendment. Id. at 894-95.
68. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that searches pertaining to automobiles are less
likely to be violative of the fourth amendment because, "[a] person travelling in an automo-
bile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). This automo-
bile exception, when coupled with the aforementioned border searches exception, excludes a
significant number of cases from scrutiny, even by the stop-and-frisk doctrine's diluted test.
69. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
70. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
71. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
72. 434 U.S. 106 (1978).
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if they can vocalize the slightest possibility of either greater lawlessness
or danger.
D. Floundering in the Quicksand: The Cases after "Generalized
Suspicion"
Once the Court eradicated the "particularized suspicion" doctrine, the
Court's attempts to clearly define fourth amendment restrictions resulted
in a confused ambiguity. In Delaware v. Prouse,3 the Court condemned
purely arbitrary traffic stops. In Prouse, the officer plainly stated, "I saw
the car in the area and wasn't answering any complaints, so I decided to
pull them off." 4 The Court deemed the search improper because a proper
search requires "some quantum of individualized suspicion; 7 5 the of-
ficer's overabundant discretion invalidated this search.7 6 The Court deter-
mined that stops of vehicles violating traffic laws were equally likely to
uncover unlicensed drivers as random stops." Clearly preferring an objec-
tive standard over a subjective one, the Prouse Court found a less onerous
alternative and invalidated the random traffic stop procedure.7 8 Had the
Court continued to apply this requirement, a clearly objective standard
would remain to limit police discretion. The loss of the least onerous al-
ternative test results in the reasonability standard being more susceptible
to subjective and therefore, non-uniform analysis.
Still concerned about the possibility that Mimms could allow wholly
capricious behavior, the Court decided Ybarra v. Illinois.79 In Ybarra, of-
ficers procured a warrant from a magistrate to search a bar for drugs. The
officers searched all the patrons of the establishment. The Court con-
demned this practice and recognized that fourth amendment constitu-
tional protection is individualized and does not provide for a "cursory
search for weapons" or anything else. 0
Ybarra and Mimms may be reconciled. In Mimms, the driver aroused
individual suspicion by driving a car with expired tags, an illegal act. In
Ybarra the bar patrons committed no crime. However, no distinct line
distinguishes a legitimate weapons search from an impermissible one.
Shortly after Ybarra, the Court asserted in Michigan v. Summers8 l
that the detention of persons at a place being searched pursuant to a
warrant was constitutionally permissible. With this decision the Court de-
73. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
74. Id. at 650-51.
75. Id. at 654-55 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
76. Id. at 655.
77. Id. at 659-60.
78. Bacigal, supra note 2, at 799-803.
79. 444 U.S. 85 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
80. Id. at 93-94.
81. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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cided that pursuant to a search warrant, seizures are permissible but
searches of persons are not. If a workable doctrine is to emerge, this dis-
tinction will require the Court to address the permissible scope of each
under marginally different circumstances. The Court resorted to making-
just such petty factual distinctions in Florida v. Royer82 and acknowl-
edged the difficulty in delineating a clear rule:
There will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much
variation that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a
paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the question
whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.8 3
The question that leaps to mind is if no sentence or paragraph will suffice
to explain a rule, will the adjudication of twenty cases make the doctrine
clear? Fifty? One hundred? As the Court decides each case, instead of
becoming more lucid, the reasonable suspicion doctrine becomes more of
an enigma.
In Kolender v. Lawson,84 the Court found a California vagrancy statute
to be unconstitutionally vague. The statute provided that a police officer
could demand that any individual account for his presence by providing
credible and reliable identification coupled with a reasonable assurance of
trustworthiness.85 In striking down this statute, the Court established cri-
teria for drafting statutes which will not fail for vagueness by including
the requirement of individualized suspicion. By providing guidelines to
the legislatures, the Court attempted to redefine the doctrine it fash-
ioned. Arguably, the clarification process still does not work. As the Court
continues to add variables to consider in the balancing test, it approves
expanded discretion which results in more confusion.
The stop in United States v. Place8 involved officers at the Miami
International Airport. Suspicious of Place, the officers approached him
and asked for his ticket and identification. Place complied with the of-
ficers' request. The officers further questioned Place's behavior after no-
ticing a difference in his purported and actual destination and other sus-
picious conduct. The officers then contacted their counterparts at Place's
destination, La Guardia Airport, who questioned him upon his arrival.
The New York officers confiscated Place's luggage and submitted it to a
sniff test by a trained canine. The dog reacted positively to one of the
bags. Since it was late Friday afternoon, the officers held the luggage until
82. 460 U.S. 491 (1983)(plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 506-07.
84. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
85. Id. at 355-57.
86. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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a warrant was obtained on the following Monday. Upon opening the bag,
the officers found cocaine.
7
In deciding Place, the Court announced that the length of the stop was
an important factor in determining intrusiveness, although the Court de-
clined to endorse any definite guidelines.8 The Court struck down the
seizure due to the long, yet preventable delay, and the police failure to
inform appellant of the whereabouts of his belongings or when retrieval
would be possible. This seizure exceeded the officer's authority and there-
fore violated the fourth amendment.8 9
In the Place decision, the Court failed to take advantage of an opportu-
nity to implement an objective standard, leaving the fourth amendment
protections in a subjective oblivion without ascertainable boundaries. Jus-
tice Brennan again wrote his own opinion, a concurrence in the result
only, warning of the dangers of balancing at the expense of the fading
probable cause requirement.9 0
The decision in Michigan v. Long91 freed another privacy-encroaching
monster from the Pandora's box opened in Terry. This decision author-
ized searching not only the driver in a traffic stop, but the area within his
or her control. Justice Brennan's predictable dissent rang with a familiar
warning, "[i]n sum, today's decision reflects once again the threat to
Fourth Amendment values posed by 'balancing.' "92
Soon thereafter, Justice Brennan vocalized his apprehensions in an-
other dissent in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado.9 3
He argued, "the Court has become so mesmerized by the magnitude of
the problem that it has too easily allowed Fourth Amendment freedoms
to be sacrificed. 9s 4 In Delgado, armed, uniformed agents from the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service ("INS") questioned factory workers.
87. Id. at 698-700.
88. Id. at 709; cf., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(l) (1975) (pro-
scribing twenty minutes as the maximum detention time for a Terry stop).
89. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
90. Id. at 717-20 (Brennan, J., concurring). Joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan
wrote:
The Court acknowledges that seizures of personal property must be based on prob-
able cause .... Despite this recognition, the Court employs a balancing test drawn
from Terry to conclude that personal effects may be seized based on reasonable
suspicion....
... Today, the Court uses Terry as a justification for submitting to these pressures
[upon the Court to water down constitutional guarantees]. Their strength is apparent,
for even when the Court finds that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated it cannot resist the temptation to weaken the protection the Amend-
ment affords.
Id. at 717, 720.
91. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
92. Id. at 1063 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
94. Id. at 239-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The INS equipped these agents with walkie-talkies and posted armed
agents at the exits. The Supreme Court denied that these actions consti-
tuted a search at all.9s Not surprisingly, commentators criticized the Del-
gado decision for its inconsistency with prior holdings,96 and dangerous
nebulousness: "[T]he shocking aspect of this trend [to expand the ability
of police to react more effectively] is that the fourth amendment protec-
tions are being slowly chiseled away.
'111
The Court again weakened the "reasonable suspicion" doctrine in
United States v. Hensley,9" a broad holding allowing police officers to
effectuate a Terry stop if he or she has a reasonable suspicion that the
person encountered was either wanted for, or involved with, a completed
felony.9 In Hensley, the suspicion arose from a wanted flyer distributed
by a neighboring police department. The Court found this practice to be
"reasonable."' 10 0 Professor Harper calls Hensley "a good example of the
type of citizen/police confrontation that should be avoided."'' 1 He main-
tains that the Hensley expansion will not necessarily improve police ef-
fectiveness; rather, this expansion will permit police to engage in unpro-
fessional conduct and lessen judicial supervision and control by allowing
courts to judge officers' conduct with a subjective rather than an objective
standard. 02
E. The Rubble that Remains: The Cases to Contrast with Terry
Each case after Terry constituted a small step, but when compounded,
allowed for decisions like United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
0 3
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association'04 and Michigan De-
partment of Police v. Sitz, 0 5 that with the post hoc rationales, bear no
resemblance to their antecedent, Terry. Justice Brennan's fears concern-
ing the decay of the probable cause requirement became reality in United
95. Id. at 219. The Court based this assumption on the fact that any meaningful restric-
tion of workers was out of voluntary cooperation with their employer. Being consensual in
nature, the activity merited no further constitutional analysis. Id. at 218.
96. Caldwell, Seizures of the Fourth Kind: Changing the Rules, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 323,
332 (1984). Professor Caldwell questions whether Delgado was a search and seizure case at
all. He maintains that Delgado may actually have been an immigration case and not a
search and seizure case. If this is true, ramifications of the decision upon the already mud-
dled probable cause doctrine would be far less significant. Id. at 334-35.
97. Id. at 338.
98. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
99. Harper, supra note 2, at 32.
100. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229, 232.
101. Harper, supra note 2, at 38.
102. Id. at 35-42.
103. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
104. 489 U.S. 602 (1990).
105. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
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States v. Montoya de Hernandez.1 6 In Montoya de Hernandez, officers
suspected an airline passenger of smuggling drugs within her alimentary
canal and detained her for twenty-four hours in a small room. Two eld-
erly matrons watched Montoya de Hernandez and the officers told her
that she would remain there until she either defecated in a wastebasket
or consented to an x-ray; she was prohibited from using a telephone. 01
Applying the balancing test, the Court found this detention to be reason-
able using a post hoc rationale. The Court reasoned that although the
"[r]espondent's detention was long, uncomfortable, indeed, humiliating
• . .both its length and its discomfort resulted solely from the method by
which she chose to smuggle illicit drugs into this country."1 8
Justice Brennan, in his scathing dissent, reprimanded the majority for
the use of hindsight to determine reasonableness, noting that most indi-
viduals searched do not carry contraband.0 9 He also declared that the
decision in Terry in no way sanctioned this stop."0 The Court added yet
another factor to consider in search and seizure guidelines, reason for the
delay."' This consideration supports the government's side of the balanc-
ing scale by giving the government a judicially acceptable excuse. How-
ever, reason for the delay falls to illuminate aspects of governmental in-
terest or individual intrusiveness, expanding the balancing analysis even
further. Justice Brennan labelled Montoya de Hernandez a "disgusting
and saddening episode.""' Montoya de Hernandez rendered the "reason-
able suspicion" doctrine so completely amorphous that any attempt to
106. 473 U.S. 531 (1985). For more cases concerning bodily intrusions, see generally Win-
ston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (surgery to remove bullet found to be unconstitutional
because it was highly intrusive and an affront to human dignity); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample taken from conscious person is commonplace and permis-
sible if properly performed); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (blood sample taken
from an unconscious person so routine so as not to be violative); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (stomach pumping as shocking and too intrusive to be constitutional).
107. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 532-36.
108. Id. at 544.
109. Id. at 557-559 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. Justice Brennan commented:
Allowing such warrantless detentions under Terry suggests that the authorities might
hold a person on suspicion for 'however long it takes' to get him to cooperate, or to
transport him to the station where the 'legitimate' state interests more fully can be
pursued, or simply to lock away while deciding what the State's 'legitimate' interests
require. But the Fourth Amendment flatly prohibits such 'wholesale intrusions upon
the personal security of individuals, and any application of Terry even by analogy to
permit such indefinite detentions 'would threaten to swallow' the basic probable-
cause and warrant safeguards. . . . It is simply staggering that the Court suggests
that Terry would even begin to sanction a 27-hour criminal investigative detention,
even one occurring at the border.
Id. at 559 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
111. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 33.
112. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 545 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973) (Ely, J., dissenting)).
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predict its limits necessitates guesswork. By continuing to add relevant
factors, the Court sanctioned the practice of authorizing searches and
seizures for whatever reason law enforcement finds compelling, even if
never previously allowed by the Court.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,113 the Court ex-
panded the Martinez-Fuerte114 deletion of the individualized suspicion
doctrine to include legislation mandating blood and urine testing for rail-
road workers.'1 5 "We made it clear, however, that a showing of individual-
ized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be
presumed unreasonable."1 i Justice Marshall penned his discontent in a
bitter dissent joined by Justice Brennan. They examined the disintegra-
tion of the protections of the fourth amendment and concluded:
I believe the Framers would be appalled by the vision of mass governmental
intrusions upon the integrity of the human body that the majority allows to
become reality .... [T]oday's decision will reduce the privacy all citizens
may enjoy, for, as Justice Holmes understood, principles of law, once bent,
do not snap back easily.' 17
This expansion reduces the probable cause requirement to a mere fiction.
The Court no longer requires individualized suspicion, and balancing
often favors the government because the courts accord great weight to the
prevention of rail accidents, crime-fighting, and immigration control.
Finally, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,"8s the Court
further dismantled the protections of the fourth amendment concerning
investigative stops and the narrow scope of Terry."9 Sitz upheld the use
of fixed sobriety checkpoints that detained all passing motorists, even
though the police lacked any indicia of individualized suspicion. The
Court labelled the intrusion slight. 2 ' Predictably, Justice Brennan found
fault with this decision, expressing in his dissent his fear of the possibility
113. 489 U.S. 602 (1990). For a more detailed study of Skinner, see Note, The Battle of
the Balancing Tests in the Fourth Amendment Drug Testing Cases: Skinner Railway La-
bor Executives' Ass'n-The Proper Balance is Struck, 15 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 333 (1990);
Note, Reasonable Searches Absent Individualized Suspicion: Is There a Drug-Testing Ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement After Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n?, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 343 (1990).
114. 428 U.S. 543 (1976); see supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
115. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-12.
116. Id. at 624 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
117. Id. at 655 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
119. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
120. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486. But see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1978) in which
the Court stated, "[tihe flaw in the State's case is that none of the circumstances preceding
the officers' detention of appellant justified a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in
criminal conduct." The Court further stated that presence in a crime-ridden area is not
enough cause for suspicion, id., however Sitz implies that mere driving is enough cause for
suspicion.
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of arbitrary government action. In discussing the scope of the governmen-
tal interest, he noted "consensus that a particular law enforcement tech-
nique serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of consti-
tutional analysis."12' This case expanded the holding in Skinner 2 2 by
dismantling the "individualized suspicion" requirement not only for rail-
way workers, a small segment of the overall population, but for motorists,
a huge portion of the population. Skinner also dealt with the public sec-
tor, while Sitz razed the individualized suspicion doctrine in the private
arena. Plainly, the holding in Sitz, which allowed detention without any
reasonable, articulable suspicion, signals the demise of the intended nar-
-row construction of the Terry decision.
The Court indulged in post-hoc rationalization to justify the intrusions
in Montoya de Hernandez,'123 Skinner,"4 and Sitz. 25 This kind of analy-
sis inevitably results in the tipping of the scales in the government's
favor. The Courts often balance in favor of the government's compelling
interests, while the precious right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures, when invoked by criminal defendants, gets lost in the judiciary's
good intentions.
The Supreme Court's perplexing decisions have either befuddled the
lower courts or given them the leeway to do whatever they want. In
United States v. Ogberaha,"2 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit proclaimed, "[w]e further note our deference to the expertise
and 'common sense conclusion[s]' of trained customs inspectors . . . who
are well versed in the 'smugglers' repertoire of deceptive practices."" 27 In
short, the court's deference allows customs officials to make determina-
tions concerning the privacy rights guaranteed under the fourth amend-
ment. Conversely, a number of courts look to individualized suspicion,
even though the Supreme Court has rendered the doctrine inapplica-
ble."2  The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia lamented,
121. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. 489 U.S. 602 (1990); see supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
123. 473 U.S. 531 (1985); see supra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
124. 489 U.S. 602 (1990); see supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
125. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990); see supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
126. 771 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986).
127. Id. at 658 (citations omitted).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Drinkard, 900 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1990)("[a] limited
investigative detention of a citizen by a government agent is illegal unless that agent has
reasonable suspicion that the citizen has committed or is about to commit a crime" (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); United States v. Ninety One Thousand Nine Hundred
Sixty Dollars, 897 F.2d 1457, 1461 (8th Cir. 1990) ("the investigatory stop must be sup-
ported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at
21)); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[a]n officer
may make an investigatory stop if he is aware of specific, articulable facts which, together
with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that the particular
person detained is engaged in criminal activity" (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
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"[u]nfortunately, but not surprisingly, there is no brightline test for dis-
tinguishing between a lawful Terry stop and an illegal arrest." 129 This
lack of uniformity adds an unnecessarily capricious element to American
criminal procedure. Whether or not a seizure will be struck down depends
wholly upon the jurisdiction of the offense. Although federal crimes
should be prosecuted uniformly, varying district practices preclude this
desired and equitable result.
These search and seizure cases illustrate that stepping on the slippery
slope with Terry has led to the results in Montoya de Hernandez and
Sitz. Should the Court attempt to remedy the resulting confusion as an
undesirable end or wait for the "reasonable suspicion" doctrine to pass
through this "phase" of the maturation process? Unfortunately, the
length of time that the Court has spent trying to clarify the issue largely
discredits the "phase" theory.
IV. THE RESULTING QUAGMIRE
A. Need for Workable Guidelines
Commentators have rushed to criticize the Supreme Court for leaving
the fourth amendment in such a fluid state. The Court must solidify the
doctrine of probable cause due to its frequent application. However, the
Court faces a monumental task as "[balancing] would require an almost
complete remapping of fourth amendment doctrine."' 30 Remapping con-
stitutional doctrines is undoubtedly complex and difficult work. Further-
more, the high stakes involve rights considered absolutely vital. Justice
Gray eloquently stated, "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more care-
fully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.,"13'
Professor Bacigal, while noting the sensibility of balancing, asserts that
without a clearer method, the resulting decisions "will continue to appear
unprincipled.11 3' Professor Amsterdam observes the difficulty of institut-
ing a doctrine with such real-world implications, for "the welter of life is
constantly churning up situations in which the application of clear and
411, 416-18 (1981)); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1989) ("the
stop and frisk at issue here was lawful only if it was conducted on the basis of reasonable
suspicion"); United States v. Levetan, 729 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[s]uch a [rea-
sonable, articulable] suspicion is necessary to justify a limited seizure or investigatory." (cit-
ing Terry, 392 U.S. at 1)).
129. United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1989).
130. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 398.
131. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
132. Bacigal, supra note 2, at 803.
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consistent theories would produce unacceptable results. '133 He writes,
"the Supreme Court is strongly cautioned to keep its contours fluid, so as
to maintain extensibility over the unexpected.' 134 Professor Harper per-
ceives a "public outcry for greater protection from criminals.M
3 5
Defining the fourth amendment presents an arduous task, especially
with the ambiguities contained in the language of the amendment itself.
"The work of giving concrete and contemporary meaning to that brief,
vague, general, unilluminating text written nearly two centuries ago is
unescapably judgmental. In the pans of judgment sit imponderable
weights." 136 Professor Landynski declares, "[t]he search and seizure pro-
vision . . . ha[s] both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity."M37
Clearly, the Supreme Court Justices disagree on the basic meaning of the
words of the fourth amendment."s s Additionally, interpretation of the
framer's intent yields few clues in the search for a practical yet protective
result. 139
Not only do lawyers and judges utilize the probable cause standard in
courtrooms, but law enforcement personnel and magistrates must apply
the standard daily, making the ambiguity of the doctrine particularly
troublesome. "[T]he 'unreasonableness' standard is obviously much too
amorphous either to guide or to regulate the police. Lurking beneath the
difficulty, in turn, is the monstrous abyss of a graduated fourth amend-
ment . . . splendid in its flexibility, awful in its unintelligibility,
unadministrability, unenforceability and general ooziness." ' Professor
Schwartz notes the dangerousness of this unintelligible standard because
the power to stop necessarily includes the power to use force to effectuate
that stop.' The lack of concrete guidelines results in the use of more
force, both legitimate and illegitimate. 42 He lists situations in which pos-
sible suspicious activity may be taking place to illustrate the subjective-
ness of the decision police officers would be forced to make without clear
criteria.' 4 '
133. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 351.
134. Id. at 386.
135. Harper, supra note 2, at 43.
136. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 353-54.
137. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at 42.
138. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1984); Id. at 370 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
139. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 398.
140. Id. at 414-15.
141. Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J.
CRiM L. & CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc!., 433, 448 (1967).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 455. Professor Schwartz postulates:
(1) Without a coercive stop, how can officers secure the cooperation of someone
travelling at 60 miles per hour?
(2) Can the police be prevented from shouting "stop" at a running man and from
1991]
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In 1969, Professor Sokol published a small book of guidelines for police
officers entitled The Law-Abiding Policeman.'4 He poses the question,
"[ilf a person is suspicious, can you frisk him?' ' 4 5 In his answer he pro-
poses the need to question first before conducting a limited search of only
outer clothing and weapons. 4 " He closes stating, "[i]f you don't have
probable cause to arrest a person, your right to frisk him is severely lim-
ited.' 47 If Professor Sokol attempted to answer the same question today,
the work would need to be significantly longer to include different stan-
dards for border searches, use of informant tips, non-dangerous situations
and a myriad of other possible circumstances that police officers face, as-
suming, of course, that discernable standards could be enunciated at all.
As stated by Howard R. Leary, police commissioner of New York City,
"[w]e do have a right to expect every policeman to know the essence of
the Bill of Rights and to carry it in his head and heart.' s However, the
Supreme Court makes this goal in regards to the fourth amendment very
difficult if not utterly impossible.
The Court needs to draw a brighter line to clarify the appropriate stan-
dard for a stop and frisk search. The difficulty arises in determining how
to draw a workable line without losing the flexibility now afforded by the
balancing approach. "Growth is what statesmen expect of a Constitu-
tion,' 49 but the danger of growing too much is clear. "This [balancing]
approach has the danger of becoming a sort of universal solvent, operat-
ing as a technique for resolving all constitutional questions without much
regard for the choices authoritatively expressed in the language of the
document itself." 50
enforcing that command?
(3) Are the police to be denied the right to freeze the situation at the scene of a
shooting by ordering that "nobody leave" to prevent a suspect or witness from per-
manently disappearing?
(4) A person running at 2:00 A.M. with a heavy package in a business
neighborhood.
(5) A person travelling in an automobile who seems to correspond to the descrip-
tion of a suspect.
(6) A person walking slowly down a street at night, looking into parked cars.
Id. (citation omitted).
144. R. SOKOL, THE LAw-ABIDING POLICEMAN (1969).
145. Id. at 31.
146. Id. at 31-33.
147. Id at 33.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 399.
150. LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures".- The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 171 (discussing United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973)).
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B. Solutions Espoused by the Commentators
Professor LaFave advocates standardized fourth amendment proce-
dures in the interest of fairness and judicial economy.151 Professor Am-
sterdam prefers that legislation or police-made regulations limit police ac-
tion and suggests making the exclusionary rule more elastic.152 To the
contrary, Professor Harper advocates a return to strict Terry interpreta-
tion, limiting the use of the "reasonableness" exception to dangerous situ-
ations requiring immediate police action. 53 Professor Bacigal favors a
"wait and see" approach to see if further adjudication will clarify the
situation.1
4
V. CONCLUSION-To EMERGE FROM THE CHAOS
Professor Bacigal made his wait and see suggestion sixteen years ago.
Patience has resulted in the further degeneration of probable cause. Cur-
rently the fourth amendment rests in dire straits. Both Justice Brennan
and Professor Amsterdam liken the graduated model to a Rohrschach
blot,'5 5 a spatter of ink that looks different to all who view it. Justice
Brennan's resignation from the Supreme Court ends a most vehement
struggle within the Court against the dilution of fourth amendment
rights. The loss of Justice Brennan's voice on the bench signals an even
more urgent need for clear, usable guidelines.
Professor Harper's plea to return to strict Terry interpretation merits
attention. He reasons that constitutional interpretation should not turn
upon public opinion or framer's notions of what was protected centuries
ago. He views the Court's role as one of watchdog, vigilantly protecting
the privacy rights of individuals in today's world.5 5 As Professor Amster-
dam points out, "[t]he problem . .. is where and how to draw an ad-
ministrable line."' 57 Since the Court has tried to draw this line for over
twenty years and has met with only minimal success, perhaps the wisest
choice for the court is a return to the first line, the Terry line. The famili-
arity and, most importantly, clarity of this standard constitutes a worka-
ble proposition. Anyone can use the Terry doctrine with relative ease,
whether it be in courtrooms, classrooms, or on the streets where police
151. Id. at 209-216.
152. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 409.
153. Harper, supra note 2, at 44.
154. Bacigal, supra note 2, at 806. Professor Bacigal acknowledges that the present state
may be "fuzzy and open-ended," but points out that these may also be beneficial
characteristics.
155. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Amsterdam,
supra note 2, at 393.
156. Harper, supra note 2, at 44.
157. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 408.
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perform under considerable duress and without much time for the careful
balancing the Court indulges in. While some of the sophistication of the
multi-factored balancing approach may be lost, the individual security
guaranteed by the fourth amendment would be retained, sealing the lid to
the Pandora's box of privacy-encroaching monsters.
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